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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND UNIVERSITY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a time-honored maxim that educational institutions must necessarily
exercise a great deal of discretion in the governance of students. But a recent shift
in the judicial attitude toward some aspects of the relationship between the student
and the university has resulted in the imposition of fourteenth amendment limita-
tions on the traditional independence of university disciplinary authority.
The development of most immediate impact has been the requirement that
fundamental procedural safeguards be afforded the student threatened with expul-
sion or suspension from a state university for a disciplinary violation.' This re-
sponse is laregly the result of recognition by the courts that the student's interest
in being allowed to remain at the university is worthy of procedural due process
protection. An additional development of potentially greater significance is the
indication that the courts will take jurisdiction when there is an unreasonable inter-
ference by the university with the exercise by students of constitutionally pro-
tected freedoms. 2 This article will discuss first the jurisdictional theory which has
brought the state university student's interest within the protection of the four-
teenth amendment, and secondly the elements of procedural due process applicable
to university disciplinary proceedings. 3
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL THEORY
A. The Nature of University Authority and the Reluctance
of the Courts to Interfere
The authority of the governing boards of state universities to prescribe and
enforce rules and regulations is conferred by state constitutional provisions
1. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
Cf. Soglin v. Kauffman, 37 U.S.L.W. 2357 (W.D. Wisc. 1968); Dickson v. Sitter-
son, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. N.C. 1968); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc.2d 467, 230
N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Egan v. Moore, 20 App. Div.2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d
622 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.E.2d 842, 250 N.Y.2d 809 (1964); Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
3, There are many current questions relating to fourteenth amendment rights
of students which are beyond the scope of this comment. E.g., May the university
discipline a student for off-campus activities unrelated to his academic life?" Is
the student subjected to double jeopardy when he is disciplined by 'the university
for conduct which is also punishable under state or municipal law? Must the rules
and regulations of a university prescribe with specificity the conduct which shall
be punishable by the university? Will the requirements of due process, substantive
and procedural, be extended to private universities under the expansive concept
of "state action"? For materials dealing with these questions see the bibliographies
at 45 DENVER L. J. 612-13 (1968) and 54 CALIF. L. REv. 175-78 (1966).
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or by statute.4 The authority to regulate student conduct may be implied if not
made express, and the term "inherent" authority is also frequently employed to
describe a source of university authority to govern students.5
The inevitable reluctance of the courts to interfere with the authority of the
university to govern its students received justification in several early theories of
the relation of the student to the university. A precept the courts found handy
was that the university, state-operated or private, stands in the place of the parent
as to the moral and disciplinary training of the student and that the courts have
no more authority to interfere than they would have "to control the domestic
discipline of a father in his family." The majority of the courts, therefore, found
judicial abstention warranted by noting that the regulation of a university is a job
entrusted to the expertise of peculiarly qualified officials who should not be unduly
hampered in the exercise of their discretion. 7
4. E.g., Mo. CONST art. IX; § 172.100, RSMo 1959. See Ray, Powers and
Authorities of the Governing Boards of State Colleges and Universities, 17 KYi.
L.J. 15 (1928).
5. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902);
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert.- denied, 319
U.S. 748 (1942); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
The courts treat the concept of "inherent authority" as distinct from authority
which is implied from a statute or constitution. The notion appears to have deep
historical roots. See, e.g., King v. Chancellor of Univ. of Cambridge, 6 T.R. 89,
106, 101 Eng. Rep. 451, 460 (K.B. 1794). Cf. Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
6. State ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866). See also
Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); John B. Stetson Univ.
v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924); Van Alstyne, Student Academic
Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Putblic Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANS. Q. 1, 3 (1965).
The doctrine of in loco parentis was originally used primarily as a defense in
suits involving potential tort liability of school teachers when administering some
type of corporal punishment to young students. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 755-756 (W.D. La. 1968). It is clear that the doctrine
retains no vitality today as to university students, having been repudiated as
inapplicable in several recent decisions. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., supra; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. State
Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Soglin v. Kauffman, 37 U.S.L.W. 2357 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
7. E.g., Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882 (1924); Samson v.
Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Jones
v. State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn.
1968). It is clear, of course, that the courts will not interfere where the discretion
of an instructor in evaluating a student's academic performance is involved, except
where a student could establish manifest malice or bad faith. Connelly v. Univer-
sity of Vermont and State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Wright
v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 728
(5th Cir. 1968).
The primary reason for the reluctance of the courts to interfere has been
described as a fear of undermining the institutional authority and autonomy of
the university. See Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HAxv. L. REv. 1045,
1148 (1968); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines for Uni-
2
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The biggest obstacle to judicial review, however, was the view that the student
had no "right" which was deserving of protection by the courts from unreasonable
treatment.8 For many years it was so clear to the courts that the student's interest
in receiving an education was a mere privilege or benefaction that the applicability
of federal or state due process requirements was not seriously considered. Hence,
the only rights of the student capable of enforcement were those specifically pro-
vided for by statute9 and those which could be found to exist under the student's
"contract" with the university.' 0 The method by which the contract approach was
often employed to secure independence from judicial review is well illustrated by
the 1926 case of Anthony v. Syracuse University."1 A co-ed was informed that
she had been dismissed from the University but was given no definitive reason
for the punishment.12 The University's defense to her action for reinstatement
was that she had contracted away her right to object to an expulsion without
cause when she had signed a waiver agreement' 3 upon her entrance. The decision
versity Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. Riw. 301, 315 (1968). For a gen-
eral discussion of reasons for judicial abstention see Chafee, The Internal Affairs of
Associations Not for Profit, 43 H~Av. L. REv. 993 (1930).
8. See Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Steier
v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959). Cf. State ex rel.
Sherman v. Hyman, where the court stated that the student had a "qualified prop-
erty right," but one which is not protected by the fourteenth amendment. 180 Tenn.
99, 111, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826-7 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
9. A few cases have dealt with a dismissal or suspension of a primary or
secondary school student in violation of statutory procedural requirements. E.g.,
State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App. 24 (1890), involving the construction
of the Missouri statute conferring upon school boards the power to suspend,
"whenever, upon due examination, they become satisfied that the interest of the
school demands such expulsion." Id. at 31.
10.
The relationship existing between the university and the student is con-
tractual . . . there is implied in such contract a term or condition that
the student will not be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive of
the discipline of the college or school, or as would show him to be morally
unfit to be continued as a member thereof.
Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S. 739, 740 (1902).
See also John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Booker
v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); People
ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891); Koblitz v. Western
Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C. R. 144, 11 C.C. Dec. 515 (1901); Frank v. Marquette
Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
11. 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928), aff'g, 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y.S.
796 (1927).
12. She was advised that the "school authorities had heard rumors that she
had caused trouble in her sorority house." 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.S.
435, 437 (1928).
13.
Attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right. In order to
safeguard those ideals of scholarship and that moral atmosphere which
are in the very purpose of its foundation and maintenance, the University
reserves the right, and the student concedes to the University the right,
to require the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason
[Vol. 34
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of the lower court to nullify the waiver for policy reasons' 4 was reversed on
appeal. The appellate court found that the waiver simply meant that the student
need not be given a reason for the dismissal. Since the student plaintiff had the
burden of proving a breach by showing that her dismissal was not related to legit-
imate university objectives, 15 and since she could make no such showing, the
decision of the lower court had to be reversed. Another well known early case
held that the student could be dismissed even though guilty of no "overt act,
if he is not in accord with [the university's] standards," where the student had
impliedly agreed to such a regulation.' 6
Since no state had by statute imposed restrictions on the freedom of dis-
ciplinary activity by the state university, and since the courts generally drew no
distinction between state universities and private universities, the state university
student generally found himself in the same position as the student at a private
university.' 7 It gradually became the position of a majority of the courts that
there was a condition implied in the contract that the student would not be dis-
deemed sufficient to it, and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need
be given.
130 Misc. 249, 257, 223 N.Y.S. 796, 806 (1928).
14. The provision was held repugnant and void because it was deemed lack-
ing in mutuality and fairness. 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y.S. 796 (1927).
15.
The University may only dismiss a student for reasons falling within two
classes, one in connection with safeguarding the University's ideals of
scholarship, and the other in connection with safeguarding the University's
moral atmosphere. When dismissing a student, no reason for dismissing
need be given . . . [although the] reason must fall within one of the two
classes mentioned above.
224 App. Div. 487, 491, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 440 (1928).
16. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 519, 102 So. 637, 641 (1924).
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), made it clear
that such provisions in contracts with state universities are not enforceable. The
argument could be made that such a provision in a contract with a private
university would also be unenforceable because unconscionable, as falling within
the category of "adhesion" contracts. See Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process
and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368, 370-371 n. 9 (1963). But
cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc.2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1962), up-
holding the dismissal of students for participation as witnesses in a non-Catholic
wedding; and Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), holding
that a private university could dismiss a student without notice and hearing for
any reason "deemed sufficient to the university," where the catalog stated that the
university reserved this right. The Greene decision, currently pending decision on
appeal, has been argued. Before hearing the appeal on the merits, the court of ap-
peals ordered temporary reinstatement of the students. Civil No. 1949-67 (D.C.
Cir., Sept. 8, 1967).
17. E.g., State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
In People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d
635 (1956), a student was suspended and subsequently expelled from a public
university, without notice or a formal charge, after an informal appearance before
the disciplinary committee. This decision may be criticized as not allowing the
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missed from the university without notice and some form of an opportunity to be
heard in his defense,18 but this rule only went as far as the procedures employed
in the dismissal and not to the substantive reason for the action. The only implied
substantive condition that could be found was that the student could not be dis-
missed "arbitrarily."' 9 In practice this meant that the aggrieved student was
required to show that the punishment had no relation whatsoever to the ideals
of scholarship or discipline. Moreover, the majority view regarding procedural
safeguards, drawing no distinction between public and private universities, re-
mained very flexible and the courts found it easy to say that, under the circum-
stances, the university authorities had done all that was required by "fundamental
fairness." °20 In short, the student was virtually unable to obtain review of his
dismissal without a showing of malice or bad faith on the part of the university.
B. Initial Considerations of the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
The first case to consider the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to the
exercise of disciplinary authority was a 1942 case in which the court adhered to
the majority view that the law requires that the university give notice and a
chance to be heard to the student before he may be dismissed. But the court
refused to base the decision on constitutional grounds, stating that "the due
process clause of the Constitution can have no application where the governing
board of a school is rightfully exercising its inherent authority to discipline stu-
dents."2'
A significant development occurred in 1948, with the enactment of federal
legislation making the federal courts available for the litigation of cases involving
deprivation of civil rights regardless of the amount in controversy.22 In 1958 a
18. E.g., Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904); State ex
rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928);
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. de-
itied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958). For an example of
the contrary view taken by some courts, see People ex Tel. Bluett v. Board of Trus-
tees, note 17 supra.
19. People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College, 60 Hun. 107,
14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891), aff'd 'mem., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891);
Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Frank v. Marquette
Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
20. E.g., State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928),
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99,
171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); People ex tel. Bluett v.
Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956).
21. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, note 20 supra, at 111, 171 S.W.2d at
827. The Court felt that notice and hearing were required, not as an essential of
due process, but rather because of a "rule so uniform it has become a rule of law."
Id. at 109, 171 S.W.2d at 826. Some confusion has arisen from the ambiguity of
the opinion, and it has also been urged that the case could stand equally well for
the proposition that the due process clause is applicable, and that the require-
ments were satisfied in this case. Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368 (1963).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958), providing:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . (3) To redress
[Vol. 34
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former student at state-supported Brooklyn College brought an action in a federal
court alleging that his expulsion was in violation of his rights of due process,
equal protection, and free speech. The dismissal of the action by the district court
was affirmed,23 but the appellate tribunal split 2-1 on the jurisdictional issue, with
two of the judges expressing their opinion that the federal courts did have juris-
diction to hear a student's claim of a denial of due process. 2 4 But it was not until
a few years later, when the scope of the federal statute providing for liability
of one acting under state authority25 was expanded,26 that it became clear that the
student might seek redress in a federal court if he could establish that he had an
interest within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
C. The Response-Protection of the Student's Interest
In 1960 a group of students at Alabama State College for Negroes were dis-
missed for their continued participation, despite a warning by the president of the
college, in civil rights demonstrations near the courthouse and other county office
buildings. Notices of expulsion were mailed to the six plaintiffs, but no charges
were made and no opportunity for hearing was granted prior to expulsion. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Edu-
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States.
23. Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959),
aff'g 161 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
24. Judge Moore felt that the federal district court had jurisdiction to hear
Steier's claim that he had been deprived of a constitutional right, but that since
the facts showed that his dismissal had not been unreasonable or improper, the
dismissal by the district court should be affirmed. Judge Gibson, also voting to
affirm, did not feel that the district court originally had jurisdiction to hear this
cause because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), had generally not been construed to
afford a right of action except where there had been systematic discrimination
against a racial or other minority group. E.g., Cranney v. Trustees of Boston
Univ., 139 F. Supp. 130 (D. Mass. 1956), Judge Clark dissented, agreeing with
Judge Moore that these civil rights acts were meant to confer upon the federal
district courts the jurisdiction over the student's asserted denial of due process.
He believed in addition that Steier had pleaded a case sufficient to get by the
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
25. It was necessary for the student to base his prayer for relief upon a
statute such as 42 U.S.C. §'1983 (1958), since 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) requires that
the civil action be "authorized by law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute . .. of any State . . . sub-
jects . . . any . . . other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), made it clear that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958) was to have a broad application, indicating that it could now also be




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
cation,27 reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit by the district court, holding that
due process requires that students at a state-operated college be given notice of
the charges against them and an opportunity for a hearing before they can be
expelled for misconduct.
Since it had by this time been established that the federal courts had juris-
diction of a student's suit for deprivation of a right secured by the fourteenth
amendment, the critical problem was whether the student had a constitutional
right that had been violated. The doctrine that had been relied upon by the
district court was that "the right to attend a public college or university is not
in and of itself a constitutional right,"28 but the appellate court pointed out that
the Supreme Court had abrogated the distinction between "rights" and "privileges"
where governmental action unjustifiably injures the interests of private individ-
uals. The theory is that if the government is going to act, it may not proceed
unfairly or arbitrarily where private interests are at stake, even though the gov-
ernment may have no duty to act at all, and even though it is merely dispensing
"gratuities." The most notable example is in the area of public employment.2 9
The Supreme Court has never specifically passed on the question of whether
the student's interest in his continued education comes within the protection af-
forded to "life, liberty, or property" by the due process clause, but the Dixon
opinion seems to indicate that the word "liberty" encompasses what is being
protected:
Without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be able to earn
an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as com-
pletely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens . . .
expulsion may well prejudice the student in completing his education at
any other institution. Surely no one can question that the right to re-
main at the college in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing
is an interest of extremely great value.30
27. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'g 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
28. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala.
1960).
29. E.g. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract
right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro-
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, at 192. See
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
30. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
It is interesting to compare this statement to a statement of the Supreme Court
in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, (1954), which, unlike its companion case,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided on due process
grounds since the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not
applicable to the federal government: "Liberty under the law extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be
restricted except for a proper governmental objective." 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957). But for a logical argument that the right really involved is an equal
[Vol. 34
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Dixon was undeniably a sharp break with tradition, making it clear that the
state university's power to dismiss a student for misconduct is subject to limita-
tions imposed by the fourteenth amendment. The decision reaches the implicit
conclusion that there are reasons why this area of administrative activity should
be subject to at least some of the procedural requirements of other areas where
the government deals through an agency with the interests of private individuals.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROcEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. The Initial Guidelines
The court in Dixon indicated its recognition of the fact that there are several
factors to be considered in determining the requirements of due process, but they
emphasized that the "extremely great value" of the student's interest was con-
trolling where there are no considerations of immediate danger to the public, or
of peril to the national security,31 which should prevent the board from exercising
at least the fundamental principles of fairness. The court made it clear that it
was not attempting to define a rigid formula applicable to every situation, but
"for the guidance of the parties," it indicated generally the nature of the notice
and hearing required. "The notice should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion. . . . The nature
of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case."32 Viewing the situation before it, the court stated that "something more
than an informal interview" was necessary-something that would give "an op-
portunity to hear both sides in considerable detail." While specifying that a full
scale judicial hearing, with the right of cross-examination of witnesses, is not
required, the court stated that nevertheless "the rudiments of an adversary pro-
ceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college."33
protection right, see Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN
TRANs. Q. 1 (1965). This view is adopted in Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
31. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 30 at 157. The recog-
nition by the court of the need for considering the public interest as well as the
individual interest, indicating that the test of what constitutes due process is
essentially a balancing test, was prompted by recent Supreme Court decisions in
other areas of administrative adjudication. E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
32. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
33.
In the instant case, the student should be given the names of the wit-
nesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which
each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present
to the Board, or at least to an administrative official of the college,
his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf. If the hearing is not
before the Board directly, the results and findings of the hearing should
be presented in a report open to the student's inspection.
8




Following closely on the heels of Dixon was a case involving the expulsion
from Tennessee A & I State University of students who had been convicted of
disorderly conduct by municipal authorities in Jackson, Mississippi, for sitting in
at bus terminals during the summer vacation.3 4 Since they had been suspended
under a regulation requiring such action when a student was "convicted on charges
involving personal misconduct," and since, without notice and a hearing, ". . . the
committee did not know and had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs had
actually done . ..,"3 the summary dismissal was a violation of due process. In
ordering reinstatement of the plaintiffs pending notice and hearing, the court
stated that consideration should be given to the observations made by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Dixon case.
One 1963 case represents the attitude that a broad view should be taken of
the whole proceeding, and that, in particular, the requirement of notice may be
liberally construed if there is no indication that unfairness resulted from the failure
to give more specific notice. In Due v. Florida A & M University,36 the plaintiffs
had been convicted of contempt in a Florida circuit court for violation of a re-
straining order issued against student demonstrators. The plaintiffs were tele-
phoned and advised to appear before the University Discipline Committee. Upon
presenting himself, each plaintiff was then advised of the charge against him.
The plaintiffs made no requests for the calling of witnesses or the securing of coun-
sel.37 The court, after quoting the Dixon statement that due process does not re-
quire a full judicial trial, stated:
More specific routines of notice and advisement may be indicated
in this regard, but a foisted system of rigid procedure can become so
ritualistic, dogmatic, and impractical as to itself be a denial of due
process. The touchstones in this area are fairness and reasonableness 38
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 32, at 159. The. Dixon decision
has been constrtmd in subsequent cases as holding only that some notice and some
hearing must be afforded the student. E.g., Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 392
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968). The problem is that "hearing" is a term of indefinite
meaning, which may be intended to denote either a trial-type hearing or an
argument-type hearing. K. DAvis, ADMINsIsa VE LAW TExT, § 7.01 (1959).
While Dixon and subsequent cases indicate that a full trial-type hearing is not
necessary, it is clear that more than an argument -type of hearing is necessary
when "adjudicative facts" are in dispute, and that at least some elements of the
trial-type hearing must be afforded the student who demands a trial of the fact
issues upon which the contemplated disciplinary action is based. See note 5z infra.
34. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
35. 200 F. Suppr. 174, 180 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). The school authorities were
even uncertain as to the exact charge pending against the students.
36. 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
37. The plaintiffs admitted the contempt convictions, but argued that they
had been improperly cited for contempt because the circuit court had erroneously
concluded that they were the leaders of the demonstration in which they had
participated. Due v. Florida A & M University, 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
38. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., supra note 37, at 403.
[VoL A4
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As a result of cases adhering to the line of reasoning in Due, it is relatively
clear that "fundamental fairness" continues to characterize the approach of the
majority of the courts to student disciplinary cases. In one recent case39 two of
the students had been personally observed by the dean of the university while
engaged in activities violating university regulations.40 The dean requested of
one of the students that he come to the dean's office to discuss the incident, but
the student never appeared. The dean subsequently made attempts to contact the
two students by mail, but both of them had failed to keep the university informed
of their mailing addresses, as required by regulation. At the end of the term,
the plaintiffs received notification that they would not be permitted to re-enter
the university. The district court stated that the dean exercised "his best efforts"
to inform the students of the charges against them, and that this was sufficient,
"particularly where their whereabouts were not disclosed to the University in
violation of a valid regulation."41 Significantly, the court emphasized that the
holding of Dixon does not extend to the question of the adequacy of notice and
hearing, but to "whether the students had a right to any notice or hearing what-
ever before being expelled." 42 In another case,43 the student plaintiffs were not
given specific notice of the charges against them until two days before their
hearings were to begin, although they had requested a clarification of the vague
statement of charges they had earlier received. The court held there was no denial
of procedural due process, distinguishing Dixon and Knight v. State Board of
Education44 on the ground that in those cases the final disciplinary action was
taken before the students had been given any notice or an opportunity for a
hearing.45
A somewhat stricter judicial attitude is represented by a 1967 case involving
the suspension of two students from Central Missouri State College.4 6 Following
their participation in two nights of disturbances, each of the plaintiffs was orally
advised of the reason the college was considering taking action, and each was
given an opportunity to appear before the dean of men. It appeared that the
39. Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., -392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'g
277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.Tex. 1967).
40. Of eight student plaintiffs, five had been dismissed for scholastic de-
ficiencies. The complaint of these students was properly dismissed because no
court can be expected to pass upon the scholastic fitness of a student-this is an
area the courts leave totally to the discretion of the school. See note 7 supra. The
sixth plaintiff appeared before both the Dean and the President of the University,
with an opportunity to speak in his own defense. The court found no evidence
indicating the hearing was inadequate.
41. Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
42. Id. at 112, quoting from Dixon (emphasis added).
43. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968).
44. 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). See discussion in text accompany-
ing note 34 supra.
45. See also Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968); Zan-
ders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
46. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967).
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plaintiffs were somewhat uncertain of the precise charges against them, and that
the dean was only one of a number of persons comprising the board making the
recommendation of suspension. Holding that due process requires that the hearing
be held before the person or group of persons responsible for determining the
facts in issue and the action to be taken, the court ordered a new hearing with
additional procedural safeguards. 4 7
In recognition of the controversy regarding the appropriate current standards
of judicial review in student disciplinary cases, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri recently conducted hearings in an effort
to achieve "clearly enunciated reliable standards" to guide future decisions within
that federal district.48 The resulting memorandum, representative of the prevalent
approach, states:
Three minimal requirements apply in cases of severe discipline, growing
out of fundamental conceptions of fairness implicit in procedural due
process. First, the student should be given adequate notice in writing
of the specific ground or grounds and the nature of the evidence on which
the disciplinary proceedings are based. Second, the student should be
given an opportunity for a hearing in which the disciplinary authority
provides a fair opportunity for hearing of the student's position, explana-
tions, and evidence. The third requirement is that no disciplinary action
be taken on grounds which are not supported by any substantial evi-
dence. Within limits of due process, institutions must be free to devise
various types of disciplinary procedures relevant to their lawful missions,
consistent with their varying processes and functions, and not an unrea-
sonable strain on their resources and personne 9
And in the next sweeping paragraph the court indicated that, aside from ob-
servance of the three minimal requirements, universities within the district need
47. The court ordered that the following safeguards be provided the student:
(1) written statement of the charge at least ten days prior to hearing;
(2) the right to appear before the person with the authorized responsibility
for determining the disposition of the case;
(3) the right to inspect in advance of the hearing any evidence to be sub-
mitted at the hearing;
(4) the right to have counsel present at the hearing for purposes of advice;
(5) the right to hear the evidence, and to question witnesses;
(6) the right to receive a statement in writing of the findings and of the
disposition to be made of the case;
(7) the right to make a record of the hearing, at his own expense.
48. The hearings were prompted primarily by the filing of three major cases in
that court. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967), claim of procedural due process violation sustained; Scoggin v. Lincoln
University, 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968), claim of procedural due process
violation sustained; and Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp.
622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), claimed violation of substantive due process held without
merit.
49. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Re-
view of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133, 147 (1968) [hereinafter cited as General Order].
[Vol. 34
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have no great concern about adherence to a technical due process scheme, as long
as it appears that the student was treated fairly:
There is no general requirement that procedural due process in student
disciplinary cases provide for legal representation, a public hearing, con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses, warnings about privileges,
self-incrimination, application of principles of former or double jeopardy,
compulsory production of witnesses, or any of the remaining features of
federal criminal jurisprudence. Rare and exceptional circumstances, how-
ever, may require provision of one or more of these features in a particu-
lar case to guarantee the fundamental concepts of fair play.50
It is true that due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,"5 1 and that the elements of procedural
due process comprise a much broader category of procedural safeguards than those
which will be found to be essential requirements in a particular case. There are,
however, some elements of due process which are so fundamental and which
impose such a negligible burden upon the university, that the courts would be
warranted in treating them as general requirements applicable to every case.
While it is true that a liberal construction of the required procedural elements
in favor of the university may seldom result in an actual injustice, inherent in
such an approach is the necessity that the court evaluate the conduct of the stu-
dent, and then measure the university's response in the light of the facts as they
appeared to the university. If it is apparent from the circumstances that the
student was probably culpable, then the fundamental fairness approach requires
only the minimum on the part of the university. While this provides for efficiency
in matters of student discipline, the difficulty is that it forces the rare student
actually receiving unfair treatment to seek relief by legal action. In a proceeding
at law, the student is severely handicapped in meeting his burden of proof by the
presumption that the university officials have operated within the proper limits
of their discretion."2 The student is entitled to a hearing by the university, re-
gardless of how irresponsible his conduct may appear. Recognition of this by the
courts will force the university to take positive steps to provide consistent and
50. Id. at 147-148.
51. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961). A frequently quoted description of the nature of due process is the one
enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGath:
Due process is not a mechanical instrument . . .It is a process .... The
precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner
in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office
of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt com-
plained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations
which must enter into the judicial judgment. 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
52. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D.W.Va. 1968).
1969]
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regularized procedures that will secure far greater protection overall for the inno-
cent student.53
C. Procedural Safeguards
The burdens imposed upon the university by due process requirements will
not be as onerous as may be feared if it is true that students charged with offenses
are usually willing, when confronted, to admit the violation and accept the
punishment.5 4 For these students an informal interview is sufficient. Moreover,
there is less need for regularized procedure where the penalty is less than suspen-
sion, and will result in no permanent notation upon the student's record.5 5 But
each student charged with a serious violation should be given notice of the charges
and the nature of the evidence against him, and directed to meet informally with
a dean or other appropriate official. When he appears before the dean, the student
should be informed of the punishment appropriate to the offense, and then given
at least three options: (1) to admit the violation and accept the punishment
indicated, (2) to elect to appear informally before a regularly constituted hearing
board, either for the purpose of denying the violation or of showing mitigating
circumstances, or (3) to elect a formal hearing before the board. Allowing the
student to choose between these three alternatives would provide assurance of fair
treatment to the student, and yet would leave the university free to employ sum-
mary procedures where there is no need for, and the student does not desire, a
formal hearing.
The proper procedural safeguards attendant to a formal hearing must be
determined from the relative position of both parties. There are some aspects of
a full adversary hearing that the university is simply not equipped to handle. 58
Nevertheless, it is clear that due process now may require the observance of some
of the following procedural safeguards commonly associated with -trial-type hear-
ings,57 and may grow to require more.
53. "Due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the
best insurance . . . against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system,
of iustice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration." Byse, The
Unwersity and Due Process. A Somewhat Different View, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL., 143,
145 (1968).
54. Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF.
L. Rnv. 73, 76 (1964).
55. All of the cases have recognized that it is only where the student may
be subject to serious punishment that he is entitled to the safeguards of procedural
due process. E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp.
174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. See State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp., 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied,
277 U.S. 591, error dism'd, 278 U.S. 661 (1928); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board
of Trustees, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956). In Bluett, for example,
one of the main grounds of the decision sustaining the suspension of a student who
was suspended after an informal appearance was that the president of a university
has no authority to compel the attendance of witnesses at the hearing or to compel
them to testify if present.
57. Professor Kenneth Davis distinguishes between an "argument" type of
hearing and a "trial" type of hearing. A formal hearing held by the university
13
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1. Choice of Public or Private Hearing
When a formal hearing is to be held, the student should be able to elect
between a public and a private hearing. Of course, where there is an indication
that disruptions or assemblages would result from an open hearing, the university
should be permitted to require that the hearing be private. Moreover, a public
hearing is not an essential safeguard against unfairness, 58 and it is likely that in
most instances the student will prefer a private hearing. Nevertheless, the indi-
cation by the university of its willingness to remove the shroud of secrecy from
disciplinary proceedings will be one factor aiding the development of a relationship
of trust and understanding between students and administrators.
2. Counsel
The student should be allowed the accompaniment of a parent, lawyer, friend,
or teacher when he appears formally or informally before any university official.
But recent cases59 have made it clear that whether a student is entitled to repre-
sentation by counsel depends upon the presence or absence of other safeguards
affecting the student's overall ability to defend himself in a given situation, and
would be an administrative trial-type hearing within the definition offered:
A trial is a process by which parties present evidence, subject to cross-
examination and rebuttal, and the tribunal makes a determination on the
record. The key to a trial is opportunity of each party to know and to
meet the evidence and the argument on the other side; this is what
is meant by determination "on the record." K. DAvis, AnMINIsTRArvE
LAw TEXT § 7.01 (1959).
58, Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968), held that a failure to provide a public hearing was in no way a violation
of due process, stating that the fact that the public was excluded, "in no way
tends to establish bias or unfairness in those proceedings." Id. at 768. It is inter-
esting to note that in Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ.,
284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), the court stated that an open hearing was not
an essential guarantee, looking to factors which were not present in Zandqrs-the
fact that "plaintiff was given the right to have his counsel attend and the oppor-
tunity to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against him." Id. at 731. The
court also noted that a full transcript of the hearing had been made by a court
reporter. In Zanders, the student had the benefit of neither counsel nor a written
record of the proceedings. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the Zanders deci-
sion was legally sound as it related to the facts of that case, and that an open
hearing is not an essential element of due process in all but extreme instances.
59. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. United States
ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1950). The sixth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. now incorporated within the
fourteenth amendment, confers upon the defendant in a criminal case the right
to employ his own counsel or to have counsel appointed. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). Only one case, however, has drawn an analogy between
criminal prosecutions and student discipline. Soglin v. Kauffman, 37 U.S.L.W.
2357 (W.D. Wis. 1968), holding a university regulation unconstitutional for vague-
ness and overbreadth. Many others have rejected the analogy. E.g., Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W.Va. 1968). Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280 (D.Colo. 1968). See also General Order, op. cit. supra note 49, 45 F.R.D.
133, 142 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
19691
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no case has yet involved a situation in which the student must be afforded repre-
sentation by counsel. Several decisions, however, have stated that he must be
allowed the advice and accompaniment of counsel.60 The Supreme Court has dis-
tinguished between investigatory and adjudicatory activities of administrative
bodies, and has held that an individual is entitled to representation by counsel
where the hearing is adjudicatory.61 Recognizing that the contested student dis-
ciplinary hearing is also adjudicatory in nature, and that in some instances due
process may require fuller participation by counsel, several universities have begun
to provide for it in their disciplinary procedures.6 2
Dixon had indicated that cross-examination of witnesses may not be an
essential requirement of due process,03 but a subsequent case has ordered that
the student in that case, but not his counsel, should be given the right of cross-
examination." Disciplinary procedures at a number of universities have begun
to provide for cross-examination of witnesses by counsel as well as by the student,65
60. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277
F. Supp. 649 (W.D.Mo. 1967). See also Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc.2d 94, 281
N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), involving the removal of the right of a high school
student to take New York State Regents examinations, for alleged cheating on
one such examination. It was held that the right could not be removed without a
hearing at which she would be entitled to the assistance of counsel. But cf. Madera
v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), rev'g 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968), reversal on the grounds that the hearing was
not essentially disciplinary, but more in the nature of counselling.
61. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). Cf. Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), holding that a juvenile is entitled to representation by coun-
sel at critical stages of juvenile proceedings; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), pro-
viding that the juvenile is entitled to the assistance and advice of counsel in
preparing for his defense. But see Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W.Va.
1968), denying the students' request for representation by counsel. This denial
was based, in part, on the ground that the expulsion hearing was investigatory in
nature rather than adjudicatory, since the only function of the hearing committee
was to "gather facts and make recommendations to the president and faculty who
could accept or reject them as they might choose." Id. at 238. This aspect of the
decision ignores the holding of Esteban, note 60 supra, and also seems questionable
in view of the trend in administrative law to recognize such hearings as adjudica-
tory. See W. GELLHORN and C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1960).
62. Examples of cases in which the university went to great lengths to provide
the student with all feasible procedural safeguards, including counsel, are Goldberg
v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), and
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.Colo. 1968). In Butt-ny, the plaintiffs were
represented at the hearing by two senior law students and one law graduate.
63. This is not to imply that a full dress hearing, with the right to cross-
examine witnesses, is required. 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
64. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.Mo.
1967).
65. E.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D.Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D.La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.Colo. 1968); Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
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in implementation of the idea that the formal hearing will probably be best con-
ducted where both sides are represented by lawyers.6 6
3. Secret Evidence
Protection from the use of extra-record evidence by the university has been
recognized as an element of due process,6 7 but no case has yet held it to be an
essential requirement. It is suggested, however, that the hearing committee should
not be allowed to rely upon any evidence of which the student has no knowledge.68
In particular, any rumors communicated to the board outside of the hearing
should be presented to the student to allow an opportunity for explanation or
denial. The adjudicators should "determine the facts of each case solely on the
evidence presented at the hearing."69
66. "[Ajctive participation by lawyers will safeguard the fact-finding process
and will support the acceptability of the eventual judgment." Heyman, Soma
Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 73, 80 (1960).
It is interesting to note that the Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 258 (1968), recommends merely that the student
"appearing before the hearing committee should have the right to be assisted
in his defense by an advisor of his choice," without specifying any particular degree
of participation by counsel.
67. E.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Esteban v.
Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.Mo. 1967); Dixon v. Ala-
bama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930(1961).
68. The student "shall be permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing
any affidavits or exhibits which the college intends to submit at the hearing."
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967). If
the student is to be allowed to discover in advance of trial the evidence which is
to be used against him, it would seem anomalous that the use of extra-record evi-
dence, of which the student has no knowledge, should be permitted.
69. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649,652 (W.D. Mo.
1967). But this recommendation is limited severely by Zanders v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968), where the fact that counsel
for the hearing board acted both as prosecutor and as advisor to the board did not
amount to a deprivation of due process in the absence of additional evidence show-
ing bias or prejudice. Cf. Jones v. State Board of Educ. of and for State of Tenn.,
279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D.Tenn. 1968).
What about evidence obtained as a result of a random search of a student's
dormitory room? A recent decision on this question has held that an abridgement
of the student's right of privacy would be upheld even though there is no "probable
cause," where the search is "based on a reasonable belief" on the part of the
college authorities that a student is using a dormitory room for "a purpose which
is illegal or which would otherwise seriously interfere with campus discipline."
Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730(M.D. Ala. 1968). The theory is that college dormitory residents stand in a "special
relationship" to the college, and that the student's right of privacy may be
subordinated where the institution is properly exercising its authority to fulfill its
educational responsibilities. Ibid. However, the court's dictum indicates rather
strongly that evidence obtained by a mere random search upon no particular basis
or "reasonable cause to believe" would not be admissible under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments because the student's interest would not be subordinated
where the university has no legitimate basis for the search. Id. at 730. Cf. People
v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 229 N.E.2d 596 (1967), holding that
a high school principal, suspecting presence of marijuana in student's locker, had
properly consented to search by police over student's objections.
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A related concept is that the student should have the opportunity to appear
before the person, or entire group of persons, who have the adjudicative responsi-
bility and the responsibility for deciding the nature of the action, if any, to be
taken. In Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,70 the court specified that
the hearing should be conducted before the person or body which alone has the
actual authority to expel or suspend a student from the college. The court noted,
however, that it is only necessary that all evidence be presented to this person
or group in some appropriate manner, as by a transcript of an authorized hear-
ing.71 Hence, it is clear that the responsibility for the initial hearing may be dele-
gated to any appropriate official or group of people. 2
4. Separation of Functions
It is highly desirable from the viewpoint of the student to have the presenta-
tion of evidence against him performed by a person who does not sit as a member
of the hearing board, and who is not entitled to vote with regard to the disposition
of the case. One recent case has held that, where it had been conceded by the
student's counsel that the hearing board had acted "entirely upon a fair and im-
partial basis," the fact that the counsel for the hearing board had acted both as
prosecutor and as advisor to the board did not amount to a deprivation of due
process.73 Similarly, where two members of the faculty hearing committee had
offered testimony against the plaintiffs, the court held that this fact was not
sufficient in itself to constitute a denial of "fairness" in the absense of "a showing
of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in the outcome of
70. 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
71. Id. at 651. In Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W.Va. 1968),
the procedures of Bluefield State College had provided that a student subject to
disciplinary action could appear before the Dean of Men, Dean of Women, Faculty
Committee on Student Affairs, or the President. State law provided that the ad-judicative authority at the college rested with the president and faculty, and could
not be delegated. The aggrieved students appeared before the Faculty Committee
on Student Affairs, whose only function was "to gather facts and make recom-
mendations to the president and faculty who could accept or reject them as they
might choose." Id. at 239. Although no challenge to this procedure was made on
the basis of Esteban, supra note 69, it is not likely that such a challenge would
have been sustained, because of the fact that a full transcript was taken at the
hearing before the committee, and was preserved for review by the faculty and
president.
72. It is clear that due process does not require that any members of the
student body should sit upon the hearing board. But in recognition of the value
of such a provision, some universities provide for the hearing board to be composed
of some student members as well as faculty or administrators. E.g., University of
Missouri Rules of Procedure in Student Disciplinary Matters, § 5 A (1968); Uni-
versity of Oregon Student Conduct Program, § E (1965), reprinted at Symposium:
Student .Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 67 (1966). Similar pro-
cedures were also provided by Troy State University in Moore v. Student Affairs
Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.Ala. 1968).
73. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D.La.
1968). State courts and federal courts have generally held, in review of adminis-
trative adjudications, that due process does not forbid the combination of investi-
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a case." 74 There would seem to be no justification, however, for requiring an
affirmative showing of bias where the challenged member of the hearing board
performs the total function of prosecutor in the case, and is not simply a witness
testifying against the student. It is also, of course, highly desirable that any per-
son testifying in the case should not sit as a member of the hearing board.
5. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
It has been urged by some writers75 that the student who requests a formal
hearing should have the right to remain silent and the right to refuse to answer
questions which might produce evidence subjecting him to: (1) punishment for
violation of a university regulation, and (2) punishment by civil authorities for
violation of state or municipal law. That a student should not be compelled
to give evidence incriminating himself was recognized in one case,76 but the court
did not regard the question as a constitutional issue. Cases in other areas of ad-
ministrative activity indicate that this right, guaranteed only recently against
state abridgement by the fourteenh amendment,7" is becoming an essential ele-
ment of procedural due process in proceedings other than criminal prosecutionss
Nevertheless, it does not appear likely that this right will be extended into the
student disciplinary area in the immediate future.
6. Record
The right to make a full and complete record of the hearing has been recog-
nized as an element of due process, 79 but it has not been held that the university
is bound, at its own expense, to make a complete record if the student does not
have one made on his own. One case, however, has indicated that, although the
74. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190,
200 (M.D.Tenn. 1968).
75. E.g., Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 73, 82 (1965); Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Stu-
dents, 42 TEx. L. REv. 344, 356-60 (1962). It is clear that allowing the student
the right to remain silent would be totally inappropriate in an informal hearing
before either the dean or a hearing board.
76. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn. 1942).
77. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
78. E.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), holding that a lawyer could
not be disbarred for refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds in a bar asso-
ciation disciplinary proceeding. The position of the student is arguably analogous
to the position of the lawyer in Spevack, although the potential consequences of
disbarment proceedings might normally seem to be of greater significance, or more
permanent effect, than the student disciplinary proceedings. Cf. Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), holding that police officers could not be forced to
forego the privilege against self-incrimination under the threat of being removed
from their jobs, during the course of a state investigation of alleged traffic ticket
fixing.
79. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.Mo.
1967); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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university is not bound to provide for a record, the university must as an alterna-
tive provide a de novo hearing in the event of an appeal by the student.80
7. Written Findings
The hearing board should submit to the student written findings of fact
whenever the student has put the facts in issue at a formal hearing.8' The student
should also be informed of the way in which such findings relate to the pertinent
university regulation. Without such information, the student is unable to know
the precise basis of the decision, and is consequently unable to frame a challenge
to the decision on an appeal.
8. Appeal
The right of appeal to the governing body of the university has long been
recognized, in practice, as an element of due process,82 and one case has recom-
mended the provision of such a right.8 3 The student need not be afforded a hearing
de novo, but the record should be reviewed and the student should be allowed to
file a written memorandum and to appear personally.
9. Suspension Before Hearing
It is very significant that, at least in some instances, the initial hearing af-
forded the student need not be given him before disciplinary action is taken. In
two recent cases84 the students were given notice that they had been suspended
or dismissed, and that they were entitled to a hearing to show cause why the dis-
ciplinary action should not be taken. The justification for this procedure, in theory,
is that there is no greater burden upon the student than if the university post-
pones disciplinary action until after formal hearings.8 3" It would seem sounder to
describe this procedure as a legitimate exercise of the inherent authority of the
80. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968). The court took the position that the students were not denied due process
by the failure of the university to make a record of the hearing because they were
afforded a hearing de novo on appeal, which is more fair than a review of the
record of earlier proceedings.
81. This safeguard received specific recognition in Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), and Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
82. Most universities have recognized the value of providing for the right
of appeal by the student. A survey made in 1962 by Professor W. W. Van Alstyne,
to which 72 state colleges and universities responded, indicated that 90 per cent
provided for some type of appeal from the initial determination. Van Alstyne,
Procedural Due Process and the State University Student, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368,
369 (1963).
83. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La.
1968).
84. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ. of and for State of Tenn., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D.Tenn. 1968); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W.Va. 1968).
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university to maintain order on the campus, by suspending the student from classes
for a reasonable time pending his hearing.
D. The Problem of Implementation
Many universities on their own initiative are beginning to take strides to
insure that disciplinary proceedings are in accordance with due process require-
ments.8 6 From the point of view of universities seeking to maintain their autonomy
in disciplinary matters, this has been a wise decision, since the courts will prob-
ably remain reluctant to interfere as long as the university is complying with
well-recognized fundamental standards of fairness. On the other hand, recalcitrant
universities, or those which are merely slow to bring their procedures up to date,
will eventually be forced by judicial sanction to comply with the minimum re-
quirements of procedural due process.
If minimum standards of fairness, having been repeatedly articu-
lated for over fifty years, are not afforded to students in disciplinary
cases, then, as is becoming the rule rather than the exception in all fields
today, courts, state and federal, will draft rules on an ad hoc, case by
case, basis to insure that rights of students are adequately protected.8 7
Even with the approach presently taken by the courts toward review of dis-
ciplinary proceedings, the universities may have difficulty in implementing the
requisite procedural safeguards. Should the courts eventually abandon the funda-
mental fairness approach in favor of a more rigid and specific formula, the uni-
versity's limited authority may create substantial problems.88 However, the difficulty
may be considerably eased by granting some additional powers to the university to
enable it to handle its responsibilities. For example, how might the university
compel witnesses to attend the hearing?8 9 In particular, what about the witness who
is not a student at the university? By what authority can the hearing board main-
tain order and control the conduct of the participants during the hearing?
There is a need for some creative thinking in this area, and the legislatures
might provide an answer by vesting state universities with, for example, limited
authority to issue subpoenas and compel testimony, including the power to
86. E.g., University of Missouri Rules of Procedure in Student Disciplinary
Matters (1968); University of Oregon Student Conduct Program, § E (1965),
reprinted at Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rides, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 67
(1966).
87. Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 760 (W.D.La.
1968).
88. Note the procedural requirements of the court orders issued in Esteban,
set out in note 47 supra. When the university does attempt to provide a hearing
affording the student the benefit of these safeguards, the attempt may be partly
frustrated.
89. See footnote 56 supra. One suggestion has been to make the student's
willingness to testify a condition of admission, similar to the way in which some
schools require an agreement to observe the honor code as a condition of admission.
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and the State University Student, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368, 382 (1963).
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make application for contempt orders in the state courts. Another possible solu-
tion is indicated by a decision"0 of the North Carolina Supreme Court, holding
that the determination by the University Board of Trustees regarding a suspended
student's readmission was a final administrative decision within the meaning of
the state administrative procedure act.91 It is clear that the governing board of
the state university may be an "agency" within the comprehensive definition of
most state acts,92 and that a student disciplinary hearing could constitute a "con-
tested case" or "administrative decision" within the meaning of most acts.93 The
application of state administrative procedure acts where the student contests the
charges against him would provide for greater certainty as to the procedures to
be followed, and would give the hearing board the necessary authority to conduct
orderly hearings. It might be desirable, however, to provide for more flexibility in
disciplinary hearings than are allowed by the act, and to prescribe rules which
can deal more specifically with the problems encountered by the university hearing
board.
IV. A NEw CONcEPT OF UNIVERSITY-STUDENT RELATONS
With violence and turmoil a growing phenomenon on so many campuses today,
a re-evaluation of the legal theory of the relationship between the student and
the university is essential. It is clear that there are such things as "student rights"
today, but it is also clear that the courts have not been willing to allow the
emergence of individual rights to destroy or substantially impede the operation
of the educational system. The courts have recognized the necessity of revital-
izing and developing the concept of the "inherent authority" of the university to
maintain order and discipline on the campus, among both students and non-
student activists from outside the university.
But the concept of inherent authority does not sufficiently describe the rela-
tionship of the student to the university. Now that the application of the four-
teenth amendment to student discipline and to the exercise of first amendment
freedoms0 4 has exploded both the theory of in loco parentis and the validity of a
contractual analysis, a new model must be established. It is significant that al-
90. In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964). Cf. Morrell v. Harris,
418 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1966), holding that the dismissal of an employee by the Board
of Education was a final administrative decision within the meaning of the Mis-
souri Administrative Procedure Act.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to 316 (1964).
92. An administrative "agency" is generally defined as any state officer, com-
mittee, board, or department authorized by law to make rules or administrative
decisions affecting citizens. See F. COOPER, STATE ADMmISTRATIVE LAW 96 (1965).
93. A "contested case" or an "administrative decision" is defined by most
state acts as any decision, order, or determination rendered by an agency in a
proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are re-
quired by law to be determined after opportunity for agency hearing. F. COOPER,
op. cit. supra note 92, at 119.
94. For example, in Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp.
613 (M.D.Ala. 1967), the plaintiff-student was notified that he had been suspended
because of his violation of a college rule that "there could be no editorials written
in the school paper which were critical of the Governor of the State of Alabama or
[Vol. 34
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though most of the cases in recent years involving student due process claims
have been brought in the federal courts, the United States Supreme Court has
so far been able to avoid review of the lower court decisions. But the pronounced
conflicts among district court decisions95 will ultimately require an examination
by the Supreme Court of the nature and extent of the due process rights of today's
state university students.
There are several possible theories available. If we accept the idea that the
university must be prepared to deal at arm's length with college men and women,
then the obvious legal model would seem to be that of the typical administrative
agency of the government.96 The governing body of the state educational system
may be regarded as the delegate of the state's authority and responsibility for
education; hence all disciplinary action must be designed to facilitate the educa-
tional process.9 7 Reasonable rules and regulations have their place, and the univer-
sity is justified in removing a troublemaker from the university community. How-
ever, as when any part of the government deals with citizens, the state cannot
abridge or affect the substantial interest of an individual without due process
of law.08 Thus, a student may not be expelled or suspended on the basis of
the Alabama legislature." Id. at 616. Not only was the editorial written by the
student a clear example of the exercise of freedom of expression, but the president
of the college had in fact testified that this policy of not allowing criticism of the
governor or state legislature was not for the purpose of maintaining order and
discipline among the students. Id. at 618. Just a few months prior to Dickey, the
case of Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967),
had sounded the death knell for university action taken pursuant to regulations
constituting a "prior restraint," where the regulation in question stated that "the
student or any part of the student body is not to celebrate, parade, or demonstrate
on the campus at any time without the approval of the office of the President."
See also other cases cited note 2 supra.
95. For example, with regard to the student's right to appear before the body
having final adjudicative authority, contrast Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D.W.Va. 1968), basing the denial of the right to counsel partly upon the
ground that the hearing committee was not the final adjudicative authority of the
university, with Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Mo. 1967), holding that due process requires that the hearing be held before
the body with the final adjudicative responsibility. Apparently, counsel in Barker
failed to point out the discrepancy between Esteban and the procedures employed
at Bluefield State College.
96. A variation of this idea, but with essentially the same characteristics, is
the model of the public-service agency suggested in Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley
Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 64-66 (1966). An additional sugges-
tion would employ for an administrative model the regulatory powers of a mu-
nicipal government. Note, Reasonable Rules; Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines for
University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REv. 301, 333-335 (1968).
97.
An ancient malcontent who throws a brick through the window of the
social security office, a group of workers staging a sit-in for unemployment
checks, a veterans' organization picketing a V.A. hospital, may each
commit some punishable offense-but they do not ipso facto give the ad-
ministering agency cause to terminate their eligibility under these pro-
grams.
Linde, op. cit. supra note 96, at 64.
98. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 7.11-7.20 (1959).
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
failure to meet inexplicit standards of comportment or decency unless the conduct
of the student is such as to be a disruptive influence on other students or in the
university as a whole.
It has also been suggested that the relationship of the student to the uni-
versity should be regarded as a fiduciary relationship, since the purpose of the
school is to educate the students, and since the students place their trust in the
institution to perform its obligations adequately and fairly.99 As a fiduciary, the
university has an obligation to the students as a whole to dismiss or punish those
students whose conduct interferes with the education of others, and the fiduciary
model would also require the school to provide the accused student with the
maximum possible procedural safeguards. It would place upon the university the
burden of showing that all appropriate safeguards were provided the student, and
that the university performed its obligatiosn as a fiduciary in dealing with the ac-
cused student.100 The difficulty with this analysis is that it is essentially a benevo-
lent form of in loco parentis, and consequently rests too much upon the same type of
fiction. In actuality, neither a parent nor a fiduciary would sever all ties with
the student because of the student's misconduct. Moreover, according to figures
published in 1961, the mean age of American college students is more than 21
years, and there are more students older than 30 years than there are younger
than 18 years. 10' Consequently, it would seem more appropriate to emphasize the
responsibility of the student as well as that of the university.
V. CONCLUSION
The law has achieved a peculiar posture in the area of discipline of university
students. While the courts have recognized that the student's interest in being
allowed to continue his education is worthy of the same treatment afforded the
substantial interest of any other citizen which is affected by an administrative
agency, the courts remain reluctant to interfere where it is likely that no unfair-
ness to the student resulted from the procedures employed. If the courts are to
demand stricter compliance with specific elements of due process, the university
must be given greater capability to conduct an administrative type hearing.
The only alternative is to revert to an approach of extreme laxity in the con-
struction of the requirements of procedural due process.
In either case, the concept of the special nature of the university community
need not be abandoned, because in some ways the "specialness" of the university is
99. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406, 1407
(1957). Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary
Theory, 54 Ky. L. J. 643 (1965).
100. Goldman, op. cit. supra note 99, at 674.
101. This fact was recently judicially noticed by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in Soglin v. Kauffman, 37 U.S.L.W.
2357 (1968). These figures, published in 1961 by the U. S. Bureau of the Census,
are also cited in Van Alstyne, Th Student As University Resident, 45 DENE
L. J. 582, 591 (1968).
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more apparent than ever before..02 The courts have increasingly recognized this fact,
and are currently grappling with the problem of understanding what is taking place
on our campuses today.' 03 It is clear that the understanding courts have of the
proper role and function of the university, and their view of the degree of maturity
and responsibility of today's college students, will be a large factor in the develop-
ment or lack of development of rights of students under the fourteenth amendment.
As for procedural due process, the question of whether the "fundamental fairness"
approach will ever evolve into a more specific formula will depend to a great
extent upon whether the courts, recognizing the changing nature of the university
and its relationship to its students, feel that the law should be a catalyst, a re-
flector, or an impediment to the evolution toward limitation of discretion in the
discipline of university students.
JAMES M. SMART, JR.
102. Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1045 (1968); Mony-
penny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom, 28 LAw & CoNTEMp.
PROBS. 625 (1963); Murphy, Educational Freedom in the Courts, 49 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 309 (1963). See cases cited note 2 supra.
103.
Before undertaking to intervene in the educational processes, and to im-
pose judicial restraints and mandates on the educational community, the
courts should acquire a general knowledge of the lawful missions and
the continually changing processes, functions, and problems of education.
Judicial action without such knowledge would endanger the public interest
and be likely to lead to gross injustice.
General Order, op. cit. supra note 49, 45 F.R.D. 136 (W.D.Mo. 1968).
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